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The Rivas Motion: The Creative Defense
Attorney's Attempt to Circumvent
Franks v. Delaware and the Informer's
Privilege Rule

In Franks v. Delaware' the United States Supreme Court held that

a criminal defendant has the right to challenge a facially sufficient

search warrant affidavit only by making a "substantial preliminary2
showing" that the search warrant affidavit contains a false statement.

When defining the contours of this right, the Franks Court was not
presented with the problem created when the affidavit3 is based upon
information supplied by a confidential informant.

A defendant

seeking to challenge a facially sufficient search warrant affidavit

based upon information supplied by a confidential informant is often

faced with the problem of not having enough information upon
which to make the substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit

contains falsehoods. 4 Defendants in California have attempted to
overcome this problem by seeking discovery of all police records
5
relevant to the reliability of the confidential informant. The defense
seeks discovery hoping to find inaccuracies between the police records
and the affidavit with which to make the preliminary showing re-

1. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
2. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 171. See infra notes 111-38 and accompanying text
(discussing Franks).
3. Id. at 157. The Court in Franks was faced with an affidavit naming the informant.
Id.
4. See People v. Rivas 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 318, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1985). See
infra notes 151-76 and accompanying text (discussing Rivas).
5. See Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477; People v. Crabb, 191 Cal.
App. 3d 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1987); People v. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248
Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988); People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1988).
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quired by Franks.6 This discovery motion has come to be known as
a "Rivas motion." ' 7 Three California courts of appeal have allowed
such discovery of police records.8 However, one court of appeal does

not allow discovery of police records, holding that such discovery is
in violation of Franks.9
This comment will initially review the procedure involved in obtaining a search warrant.' 0 Then it will review challenging the issuance
of a search warrant and the informer's privilege rule." Next, the
federal standard that controls California law by virtue of Proposition
8,12 regarding a defendant's right to challenge a facially sufficient
search warrant affidavit will be discussed. 3 The split of authority
among California courts of appeal over the validity of the "Rivas
motion" will then be examined. 14 This comment will conclude that
the Rivas motion circumvents both the informer's privilege rule and

the federal principles set out in Franks v. Delaware and should
therefore be invalidated by the California Supreme Court.
I.

PROCEDURE INVOLVED

5

To OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that persons have a right to be secure in their persons and homes
against unreasonable governmental searches.' 6 This right cannot be

6. See People's Opening Brief at 12, Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248 Cal.
Rptr. 20 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
7. See e.g., People's Opening Brief at 16, Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248
Cal. Rptr. 20 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
8. See Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477; Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App.
3d 1258, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20. See infra notes 151-76, 194-206 and accompanying text (discussing
cases in detail).
9. See Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See infra notes 177-93
and accompanying text (discussing Crabb in detail).
10. See infra notes 16-48 and accompanying text (discussing the procedure followed by
law enforcement officials in obtaining search warrants).
11. See infra notes 61-100 and accompanying text (discussing the informer's privilege

rule).

12. 1982 Cal. Stat. prop. 8, sec 1, at A-186 (enacting CAL. CONST., art I, § 28(d)). See
infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition 8).
13. See infra notes 111-38 and accompanying text (discussing Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978)).
14. See infra notes 151-217 and accompanying text (discussing People v. Rivas, 170 Cal.
App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985); People v. Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d 390, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 385 (1987); People v. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988)
and People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1988)).
15. See infra notes 61-100 and accompanying text (discussing informer's privilege rule);
See infra notes 111-38 (discussing Franks).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
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17
infringed unless a search warrant based on probable cause is issued.
18
Although most searches and seizures occur without warrants, many
are made pursuant to search warrants, 19 and the United States Supreme Court has expressed a strong preference for searches to be
made pursuant to a search warrant. 20 The first step to obtain a
warrant is taken when a police officer 2l presents a neutral and
detached magistrate- with an affidavit 23 to support a request for a

search warrant.2 The affidavit is a statement of facts that the officer
asserts is sufficient to create probable cause to believe specific prop-

erty is located in a specific location. 25 Probable cause is a reasonable
belief that evidence or participation in criminal activity will be found

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
17. Id.
18. F. GRAHAM, THE SEix-IN- acrED WomN 204, 347 n.204 (1970)(nobody knows how
many search warrants are actually used in the United States; statistics on the subject range
from inadequate to nonexistent; but the few figures that do exist show that the ratio of
D. MCINTYRE, & D.
searches with warrants to searches without them is tiny); L. Tn'Y,
ROTE=NBERO, DETEcTION oF Citm 99-101 (1967) (in practice the search warrant is rarely used).
Arrest warrants are used even less. See, W. LAFAvE, ARR~sT: THE DECISION To TAKE A
SusPEcT INTo CUSTODY 379 (1965) (the great majority of arrests are made without a warrant).
One commentator stated, "Because most police searches are conducted pursuant to an
exception to the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court's recent re-emphasis of that requirement and its careful explication and delimitation of the exceptions are unlikely to affect
significantly current police practices." Grano, A Dilemma ForDefense Counsel; Spinelli-Harris
Search Warrants And The Possibility Of Police Perjury, U. Ia.. L.F. 405 n.1 (1971); See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-82, (1971) (listing and applying exceptions to
the search warrant requirement); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35, (1970) (listing exceptions
to the search warrant requirement); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, (1969) (narrowly
restricting the scope of a search incident to arrest).
19. See L.TDsANY, D. McIN RE, & D. ROTENRERG, supra note 18, at 103-04 (the three
crimes of gambling, narcotics, and traffic in obscene materials dominate the pattern of search
warrant usage).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
21. A police officer who writes the affidavit is also referred to in this comment as the
affiant.
22. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
23. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (providing explanation of affidavit).
24. Grano, supra note 18, at 405. A search warrant is an order in writing, in the name
of the state, signed by a magistrate, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for property and bring it before a magistrate. Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair,
46 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. N.J. 1930).
The purpose of a search warrant from the police perspective is to authorize a search for,
and a seizure of, property, to bring such property before a magistrate, and to subject the
person in whose possession the property is found to such further proceedings as the ends of
justice may require. C. E. ToRcIA, WMA4RTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §147 at 311 (12th Ed.).
25. See 2 W. LAFAvE, ARREST, SECH AND SEizuRE § 3.3 at 703 (2d ed. 1987).
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in a particular place.26 For there to be probable cause, the facts must
justify a reasonably prudent person to believe that criminal evidence
will be found in the place to be searched. 27 The probable cause
requirement attempts to ensure that an invasion of a person's privacy
will be justified by discovery of incriminating evidence.2 The neutral
and detached magistrate serves to protect against unjustifiable forcible
invasions by interposing judicial impartiality into the critical probable
cause decision.?
The affidavit for a search warrant may be based on information
given by a confidential informant if it also contains a substantial
basis for crediting that information. 30 Confidential informants frequently have criminal records and a history of contact with police."'
Tips given by confidential informants may reflect their vulnerability
to police pressure or may involve revenge or hope of compensation.3 2
Almost invariably, police informants condition their cooperation on
an assurance of anonymity. 33 This anonymity is to protect the informants and their families from harm, to preclude adverse social
reaction, and to avoid defamation or malicious prosecution actions
against them.3 4 An affidavit based on information from a confidential
informant need not disclose the identity of the informant.3 However,
the affidavit must set forth enough facts and circumstances to permit
the magistrate to measure the credibility of the undisclosed informant,

26.

See B. TARiow, THE CoMPLEm TARtow ON SEARCH W

102 (1973). Probable

cause has various definitions; this comment deals only with probable cause to issue a search
warrant.

27.

See e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Henry v. Unites States, 361 U.S. 98,

102 (1959); Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 439 (1925).

28. See Commonwealth v. Kanouff, 315 Pa. Super. 392, 394-95, 462 A.2d. 251, 252
(1983)(probable cause requirement met when facts show items sought are related to criminal
activity and will be found in place to be searched).
29. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). See also McCray v. Illinois 386 U.S.
300, 306-07 (1967) (quoting State v. Burnett 42 N.J. 377, 385, 201 A.2d 39, 45 (1964)).
30. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-33 (1964), reh'g denied 377 U.S. 940,

(1964) (substantial basis included detailed description of the furs, including the number and
type of furs which matched police reports of stolen furs) Id. at 532.
31. People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d 376, 393, 618 P.2d 213, 224, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667, 678

(1980).
32.

Id.

33. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 25, at 403 (quoting PREsIDENT's CoMnssIoN ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISThATION OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY

218 (1967)).
34. 8 WxGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).

35. See e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967) (unless the issue directly involves
the defendant's guilt or innocence, there is no fixed rule for when an informant's identity
should be disclosed).
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independent
the reliability of the information given, and to reach 3an
6
exists.
cause
probable
requisite
the
whether
judgment
Whether information provided exclusively or primarily by an informant is sufficient to satisfy the probable cause requirement has
occupied the Supreme Court and other courts with considerable
frequency.3 7 Until recently, the United States Supreme Court strictly
applied a two-pronged test to determine whether a court could issue
a search warrant whose underlying affidavit was based on information
38
supplied by a confidential informant. First, a court could issue a
search warrant whose underlying affidavit was based on information
supplied by a confidential informant only if the affiant set forth a
factual basis from which the issuing magistrate could reasonably
reliable.3 9
conclude that the informant was credible or the information
This "veracity" prong required the inclusion of facts establishing
either the inherent credibility of the informant or his reliability on
this particular occasion. 4° Second, a court could issue a search warrant
whose underlying affidavit was based on information supplied by a
confidential informant only if the magistrate could conclude from
the facts that the informant had personal knowledge of the allegations
made. 41 This "basis of knowledge" prong was essential because it
36. See eg., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 575-84 (1969)
1. Although the affiant did not allege the informant was truthful, but only prudent,
this is the type of hypertechnicality, once exacted at common law, condemned by
the court in [United States v.] Ventresca [377 U.S. 989 (1963)]. It is enough that
there was an ample factual basis for believing the informant; 2. unlike Spinelli [v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)], where the affidavit failed to explain how the
informant came by his information, the affidavit in the present case related the
personal observations of the informant; 3. an averment of an informant's previous
reliability is not necessary. The inquiry, rather, should be whether the informant's
present information is truthful or reliable; 4. in assessing the reliability of an
informant's tip, the magistrate may properly rely upon a police officer's knowledge
of a suspect's reputation. To the extent that Spinelli prohibits the use of such
probative information, it has no support in our prior cases, logic, or experience and
we decline to apply it.

Id.

37. See e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
(1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
38. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 113-15 (1964). Reference was made to "Aguilar's
two-pronged test" in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416. The United States Supreme Court abandoned
the two-pronged test in 1983. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
39. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. Establishing the informant's credibility or the informant's
reliability is often referred to as the "veracity prong". See, e.g., United States v. Gates, 464
U.S. 213, 229 (1983).
40. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113-15. To establish the credibility of the informant the affiant
gave facts to establish that the informant had been reliable in the past or that there were
special reasons to believe that the informant's information in this particular case was reliable.

Id.

41. Id. The affiant stated in the affidavit the particular means by which the informant
came upon the information which he supplied to the police. Id.
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required a magistrate to rely on facts more substantial than a casual
rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely
on an individual's reputation. 42
In United States v. Gates43 the United States Supreme Court
abandoned the two-pronged test because its rigidity resulted in a
failure to issue warrants even when a common sense decision would
indicate that there was sufficient probable cause to do so. 44 The
Court reaffirmed the traditional "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis to determine probable cause. 45 An informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge remain highly relevant in determining
probable cause. 6 However, the magistrate is to make a practical,
common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances in the
affidavit, there is a fair probability that the evidence sought will be
found in the location specified. 47 If the magistrate is uncertain whether

42. Id.
43. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
44. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. Before Aguilar probable cause was determined by the totality
of the circumstances test. Id. Justice White concurred, after explaining in some detail why he
would use Gates as a vehicle to recognize a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,
concluded probable cause existed under the Aguilar formula, which he would retain. Id. at
264-65 (White, J., concurring). Jutice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall dissented, objecting
to "the Court's unjustified and ill-advised rejection of the two-pronged test for evaluating the
validity of a warrant based on hearsay," under which they concluded the warrant in the
instant case was invalid. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens joined by Justice
Brennan concluded in his dissent that the warrant was invalid even under the Court's new
"totality of the circumstances" test. Id. at 294-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. 230. Before Gates, probable cause was determined by looking to all the circumstances as stated in the affidavit. Id.
46. Id. See also 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 25, at 194 (expecting courts will continue to
rely upon the now-discarded Aguilar formula).
47. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
A typical probable cause statement found in many search warrants based on information
provided by an informant is:
Within the past ten days, I met with an informant who has, in the recent past given
information about drug dealers which later proved to be reliable. The informant,
hereinafter referred to the CRI, told me the following:
George Luttenberger, who lives on Roberts in West Pittsburg is a methamphetamine
dealer. The CRI has seen Luttenberger sell Methamphetamine and has personally
seen Luttenberger in possession of significant quantities of what the CRI recognized
as, and what Luttenberger represented to be, methamphetamine on several occasions
in the past ten days. The CRI said that Luttenberger has no phone and no PG&E
service. The CRI said Luttenberger gets power to his home by running an extension
cord to somewhere nearby.
The CRI described Luttenberger as a white male adult, in his mid to late twenties,
approximately six foot, slim build, with brown hair worn over the collar. I showed
the CRI photo of George Robert Luttenberger, WMA, DOB 09/30/56, CDL N9181287,
Concord Police Department fingerprint #37026. The CRI positively identified the
subject in the photo as Luttenberger.
I drove the CRI to West Pittsburg where the CRI directed me to Roberts and
pointed out #20 as Luttenberger's home and where the CRI had seen Luttenberger
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probable cause exists or questions an affiant's veracity regarding the
information presented in the affidavit, the magistrate could require
the affiant to bring the confidential informant to the magistrate so
that the magistrate can question the informant. 48
II.

A.

CHLLENGING THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT

Motion To Suppress

If the search results in the seizure of incriminating evidence, a
criminal prosecution is usually initiated.4 9 Defense counsel often
pursues a motion to suppress evidence based on a fourth amendment
argument that the warrant underlying the search was invalid and
therefore the evidence cannot be used against the defendant in a
trial.5 0 If the warrant is facially invalid because the probable cause
requirement is not met in the affidavit, the evidence is suppressed.5 1
However, if the warrant is facially valid, defense counsel can attack
the affidavit in only two ways.52 First, counsel can allege that the
manner of entry was illegal.5 3 Second, counsel can challenge the
truthfulness of the statements in the affidavit establishing the existence of probable cause.5 4 In a challenge to the truthfulness of the
statements made in an affidavit based on information from a confidential informant, the defense counsel needs to learn whether the
informant actually exists, whether he has in fact given credible
information in the past, and whether he actually gave the information
related by the affiant in the warrant. 55

sell Methamphetamine.
People's Opening Brief at 8, People v. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248 Cal. Rptr.
20 (1988) (on file at the PacificLaw Journal).
48. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1967) (quoting State v. Burnett, 47 N.J.
377, 385-88, 201 A.2d 39, 43-45 (1964)). See also, Skelton v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 144,
153-54, 460 P.2d 485, 490-95, 81 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618-620 (1969).
49. Grano, supra note 18, at 407.
50. See A. AmT AmwAi, TRAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CaMnA CASES §§223-53
(1988).
51. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule created
to apply where its benefit as a deterrent promises to outweigh the societal costs of its use).
52. Grano, supra note 18, at 407.
53. Id. Absent exigent circumstances, an announcement of purpose is required before a
forced entry can be made; see e.g., United States v. Likas, 448 F.2d 607, 609 (7th Cir. 1971);
People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 588-89, 432 P.2d 706, 707-08, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 11-12
(1967).
54. Grano, supra note 18, at 407.
55. Id.
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However, to challenge successfully a facially sufficient search warrant the defense, must make a preliminary showing of misstatements
by the affiant in the affidavit.5 6 To make this showing, defense
counsel often asks the affiant for the name of the informant or asks
questions about the informant designed to test the affiant's veracity.57
Normally, prosecutors object to questions such as these based on the
informer's privilege rule.58 Even when the defense counsel does not
expressly ask for the informant's identity, prosecutors argue that the
answers given to questions asked about the informant's reliability
59
will indirectly lead to the disclosure of the informant's identity.
Whether defense counsel actually alleges that the statements in the
warrant are false or merely seeks the opportunity to challenge their
veracity, the goal of the defendant is the same: to show that the
police officer affiant did not have an informant or if the officer did,
to show that the informant did not give reliable information in the
past or present. 60
The Informer's Privilege Rule

B.

In a motion to suppress evidence seized on an informant's tip, the
information that would be most beneficial in the defendant's challenge to the search warrant is the informant's identity. 61 If the affiant
is unable to supply a name, the actual existence of the informant
becomes questionable. 62 If a name was supplied, defense counsel
could call the informant to testify as to the information given to the
officer on the present occasion and as to information provided on
prior occasions. 63 This testimony would then be compared to the
information that the officer included in his affidavit to determine

56.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 170, 155-56 (1978).

57.. Grano, supra note 18, at 407.
58. See e.g., People v. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 318, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1985);
People v. Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d 390, 392, 236 Cal. Rptr. 385, 386 (1987); People v.
Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1260, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20, 21 (1988); People v. Broome,
201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 1486-87, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854, 857. See infra notes 61-100 and

accompanying text (discussing the informer's privilege rule).
59. Grano, supra note 18, at 408. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (criminal
defendant is aware of the facts of past cases).

60. Grano, supra note 18, at 408. The defense's goal is to show that the affiant led to
the magistrate in the affidavit. Id. Perjury is a powerful word, but no other will suffice. Id.
61.
62.
63.
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whether the officer was truthful in obtaining the warrant. 64 However,
the defendant's attempt to discover the informant's identity usually
encounters a successful objection by the state based on the informer's
privilege rule. 65
The informer's privilege rule derives from the balancing of several
competing societal interests. 6 Balanced against the government's interest in protecting citizens from unlawful invasions of privacy is the
government's interest in promoting effective law enforcement through
the use of anonymous informants. 67 To fight crime, law enforcement
agencies depend upon professional informants to furnish them with
a flow of information about criminal activities. 68 Professional informants are most likely engaged in criminal activity themselves or
at least enjoy the confidence of criminals. 69 The disclosure of the
dual role played by informants ends their usefulness and discourages
others from entering into similar relationships with law enforcement
officials.7 0 Also, in some situations the disclosure can be physically
dangerous and even life threatening for the informant. 71 Therefore,
a privilege is recognized for the identity of persons supplying the
government with information concerning commissions of crimes.72
This privilege, however, creates a tension with the fourth amendment
right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.73
1. Federal Case Authority for the Informer's Privilege
A balancing test to determine whether an informant's identity
should be disclosed during trial was first developed by the United
States Supreme Court in Roviaro v. United States.74 In Roviaro, the

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957) (the public's interest in protecting

the flow of information to the government regarding criminal activity and the individual's
right to prepare a proper defense).
67. Id. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the use of anonymous
informants).
68.

McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967) (informer plays vital role in protecting

public); Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59 (informer's privilege protects public interest in effective law
enforcement).
69. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
70. Id.

71.

Locher, People v. Rivas: Discovery, Informants, and the Search Warrant Traverse,

PROSECUTOR's BRmF, Fall 1988, at 16.
72. McCray, 386 U.S. at 305.
73. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 25, at 698.
74. 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
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defendant was charged with transporting, receiving, and selling narcotics. 75 Before trial, the defendant asked for the identity of the
informant. 76 The government objected on the ground that the identity
of the informant was privileged 7 At trial, the defendant was found
guilty on both counts. 78 The courtof appeals sustained the conviction
holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying
the defendant's request for disclosure of the informant's identity.7 9
Defendant appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.80 The Supreme Court reversed and held that in the circumstances of the case, failure of the court to require disclosure of the
identity of the informer was reversible error. 81
The Supreme Court acknowledged the informer's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information
relating to crimes. 82 However, the Court stated that when disclosure
of an informer's identity, or the contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or essential to a
fair trial, the informer's privilege to withhold disclosure of the
informant's identity must give way.83 The Court stated that no fixed
rule is justifiable. 4 The Court, therefore, developed a balancing test
to determine when an informant's identity should be disclosed during
trial. 85 A court considering the issue must balance the public interest
in safeguarding the flow of information to the police with the
individual defendant's right to prepare a proper defense.8 6 In Roviaro,
the informant had participated in planning the crime, was present
with the defendant during the crime, and could have been a material
witness during trial. 87 In the circumstances of Roviaro, the Court
reasoned that the defendant's interest in knowing who the informant
was outweighed the public interest in informant confidentiality because the informant could have provided exculpatory information.88

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55-56 (citing United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812).

79. Id. at 56 (citing United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 56.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 59-61.
Id. at 60-62.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.

87. Id. at 55.
88.
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The United States Supreme Court further clarified the informer's
privilege rule in McCray v. Illinois.s9 In McCray, the Court observed
that there is no fixed rule for when an informant's identity should be
disclosed unless the issue directly involves the defendant's guilt or
innocence.9 In McCray, the defendant was arrested on the basis of
previously reliable informant's statements. 91 At the suppression hearing,
the police officer testified to the informant's reliability by supplying
names of persons who were arrested previously based on information
supplied by this informant. 92 When defense counsel asked for the name
of the informant, however, the prosecutor objected, and the trial court
sustained the objection. 93 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision to suppress the informant's identity. 94
Since McCray, a majority of courts have held that defendants do
not have a right to learn the informant's identity at a motion to
suppress evidence. 9 Disclosure is treated as a matter of judicial discretion. 96 A judge who is unsatisfied that the affiant is telling the truth
can require the government to disclose the informant's identity. 97
2.

California Statutory Authority for the Informer's Privilege
Rule

California has statutorily imposed the informer's privilege rule in
section 1042(b) of the California Evidence Code.9 Section 1042(b)
recognizes the privilege for the identity of informants who supply the
government with information concerning the commissions of crimes. 99
To establish the legality of a search or the admissibility of evidence
obtained as a result of a search, section 1042 allows a public entity
bringing a criminal proceeding to claim a privilege as to the identity
89. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
90. McCray, 386 U.S. at 309-11. In cases in which an informer may have information
fundamental to the defense, an informer's identity may have to be disclosed. Id.
91. Id. at 302-03 (police officer testified to having known the informer for approximately
one year).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 305.
94. Id.at 314.
95. See e.g., United States v. Edge, 444 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 855 (1972), United States v. Mendoza, 433 F.2d 891, 894 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied,
401 U.S. 943, (1971); Williams v. United States, 399 F.2d 670, 671-72 (10th Cir. 1968).
96. McCray, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (there is no absolute rule requiring disclosure of an
informant).
97. Id. at 311.
98. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1042(b) (West Supp. 1989).
99. Id.
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of an informant when a search is conducted pursuant to a facially
sufficient search warrant.'x°
THE RIGHT TO CHAILENGE THE VERACITY OF THE STATEMENT OF

III.

PROBABLE CAUSE IN SEARCH WARRANTS

A.

Federal Case Authority

The law regarding a defendant's right to challenge a facially sufficient
search warrant was well established in California before proposition 8
was enacted. 10' However, after the adoption of proposition 8, the law
in California regarding a defendant's right to challenge a facially
sufficient search warrant was supplanted by federal fourth amendment
standards. In Theodor v. Superior Court,'02 the California Supreme
Court held that a defendant had the right to traverse a search warrant
by challenging the factual veracity of the affiant."03 The defendant bore
the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facia case of material
inaccuracy in the affidavit. 14 If the defendant could show an inaccuracy
in the affidavit and the affiant was negligent in presenting this inaccuracy, the inaccuracy was to be corrected by the court and the affidavit
retested for probable cause. 05 The court should quash a warrant only
16
if probable cause was not met after the inaccuracy was corrected.
However, if the affiant recklessly or intentionally created the inaccuracy, the court must quash the warrant and automatically suppress the
evidence obtained with the warrant."1 7 The affidavit was not to be
corrected and retested.'08
While California law regarding challenges to facially sufficient search
warrant affidavits was developing, the federal courts were developing

100. Id.
101. People's Opening Brief at 9, People v. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248
Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
102. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
103. Theodor, 8 Cal. 3d at 100-01, 501 P.2d at 251, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243, (confirming a
defendant was authorized to traverse a search warrant through a challenge to the factual
veracity of the affidavit supporting the warrant).
104. Id. at 90, 501 P.2d at 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
105. Id. at 100-101 and n.14, 501 P.2d at 234 and n.14, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 226 and n.14.
106. Id.
107. People v. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d 376, 383, 618 P.2d 213, 217 (1980), 168 Cal. Rptr.
667, 671; People v. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d 67, 86-88, 583 P.2d 130, 140-42 (1978), 148 Cal. Rptr.
605, 615-17.
108. Cook, 22 Cal. 3d at 86-88, 583 P.2d at 140-42, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 615-17.
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a different standard. The first time the United States Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether a defendant has the right to challenge
a facially sufficient search warrant affidavit was in Rugendorf v. United
States.'09 However, the Supreme Court in Rugendorf only assumed,
without deciding, the existence of a criminal defendant's right to
challenge the truth of statements made by law enforcement officials in
affidavits supporting the issuance of a search warrant. 110
Not until Franks v. Delaware"' did the United States Supreme Court
squarely address the issue of whether a defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right under the fourth and fourteenth amendments,
subsequent to the ex parte issuance of a search warrant, to challenge
the truthfulness of factual statements made in the warrant affidavit.1 2
In Franks, the defendant was convicted of rape, kidnapping, and
burglary in a Delaware state court."' Items of clothing and a knife
seized from the defendant's apartment, pursuant to a facially valid
search warrant, were the subject of a pretrial hearing." 4 The probable
cause statements in the affidavit included averments that officers had
contacted counselors at a youth center where the defendant worked,
and that the counselors provided information regarding the type of
clothing that the defendant typically wore." 5 The defendant attempted
to challenge the veracity of the affidavit supporting the search warrant
by way of a motion to suppress." 6 The defendant contended that the
affidavit was facially deficient because it failed to show probable cause,
and that the underlying affidavit contained misstatements as to alleged
conversations with the counselors." 7 The defense offered to prove
through testimony from the youth center counselors that the affiants
never spoke to them, and that the police officers who did contact them
were not given the statements that appeared in the affidavit.", The
state objected to the defendant's "going behind" the warrant affidavit
and argued that the court must decide the motion within "the four
comers" of the affidavit." 9 The trial court denied the motion to

109.
110.

376 U.S. 528 (1964).
Id. at 531-2. "However, assuming for the purpose of this decision, that such attack

may be made, we are of the opinion that the search warrant is here valid." Id.
111.
112.

438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Id. at 155.

113.

Id. at 156.

114.

Id. at 157.

115. Id.
116. Id.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 157-58.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 160.
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the evidence. 120 The defendant was convicted
suppress and 1admitted
2

and sentenced. '
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed, holding as a

matter of first impression that a defendant under no circumstances
could challenge the veracity of a sworn statement used by police to
procure a warrant.'2 Adopting what it believed to be the "majority

rule," the Delaware Supreme Court gave two reasons for holding that
a defendant had no right to challenge a facially sufficient search
warrant. 1' First, a magistrate determines the reliability of information

and the credibility of an affiant in determining whether probable cause

exists, and the defendant presented no reason to interfere with this
process. 124 Second, the defendant's contentions that the affiant lied in
the affidavit would be more appropriately considered at a trial on the
merits. '2
26
The United States Supreme Court granted certiori and reversed.'
The Franks Court explained that the purpose of challenging a search
warrant affidavit is not to prove the inaccuracy of each fact, but to
establish that the affiant did not believe the statements in the affidavit
were truthful.'2 The Court noted that the question of whether a
defendant should have the right to challenge a facially sufficient search
warrant affidavit involved many competing interests.'2 In reconciling

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Franks v. State of Delaware, 373 A.2d 578, 579 (1977).
123. Id. at 579-80.
124. Id. at 580.
125. Id.
126. Franks,438 U.S. 154, 161. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented.
Id. at 180 (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 165.
128. Id. The prosecution made the following arguments against allowing veracity challenges:
(1) not allowing veracity challenges would be consistent with the Court's recent refusals to
broaden the exclusionary rule; (2) privacy interests are adequately protected by the requirement
that a search warrant be issued upon a sworn affidavit and by the existing penalties against
perjury; (3) the warrant-issuing magistrate can conduct a fairly rigorous inquiry into the
accuracy of the factual affidavit; (4) reviewability would diminish the role of the issuing
magistrate; (5) permitting such challenges would confuse the issue of guilt or innocence with
the collateral question as to possible official misconduct; (6) the accuracy of the affidavit in
large part is beyond the control of the affiant. Id. at 166-67.
These considerations were not "trivial", however, the Court also took into account the
folloling "pressing considerations": (1) a flat ban on impeachment of veracity could denude
the probable cause requirement of all real meaning; (2) the hearing before the magistrate is
ex parte in nature and is frequently held in haste therefore will not always suffice to preclude
police misconduct; (3) alternative sanctions are unlikely to discourage police misconduct; (4)
because a magistrates determination of probable cause is already subject to review allowing
veracity challenges will not diminish the warrant issuing process; (5) veracity challenges will
not confuse the issue of guilt or innocence because the issue of probable cause is considered
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these interests, the Court concluded that an absolute ban on postsearch impeachment was not justified, but that the defendant has a
12 9
limited right to challenge a facially sufficient search warrant. Franks,
holding that a criminal defendant can make a fourth amendment
challenge to an affidavit's veracity, is entitled to a suppression hearing
if the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the
search warrant is based on an affidavit containing a deliberate or
reckless misstatement and the statement is necessary to a finding of
probable cause.130 The false statement included by the affiant in the
affidavit can be either knowingly or intentionally false or made with
reckless disregard for the truth."'
Under Franks, the defendant must meet two prerequisites before a
hearing will occur. First, the defendant must make an "offer of proof"
32
as to the falsity of a statement made by the affiant. However, the
Supreme Court did not elaborate on what the offer of proof should
33
include, but rather left this up to state courts to decide. Second, the
defendant must allege with some particularity what portion of the
affidavit is claimed to be false and give supporting reasons.134 Affidavits
or sworn statements of witnesses are appropriate as supporting rea135
sons.
The FranksCourt's rationale for allowing a search warrant challenge
once the defendant has met the requirement of a preliminary showing
twofold. 136
that the affidavit contains a false statement or omission is
First, the requirement prevents the judicial system from becoming an
7
unintentional accessory to police perjury or fabrication. Second, the
preliminary showing requirement prevents veracity hearings from becoming a vehicle for discovery or permitting the defendant a means
138
for delay.

upon a motion to suppress without a jury; (6) allowing veracity challenges is not extending
the exclusionary rule because there is no difference between the question of sufficiency and
the question of integrity of an affidavit. Id. at 168-71.
129. Id. at 167.
130. Id. at 155.
131. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
132. Id. at 171.
133. Id. See also, Note, Franks v. Delaware, AM. J. CRIM. LAW 67, 70 (1979).
134. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 168. See Note, Franks v. Delaware: A Proposed Interpretationand Application,
U. ILL. L.F. 601, 625 (1980) (requirement of preliminary showing deters police fabrication).
138. Franks, 438 U.S. at 167. See, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. at 625 (requirement of preliminary
showing prevents veracity hearing from becoming discovery tool for defendant).
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Because of the conflict between the procedures and remedies afforded

a criminal defendant under the California search and seizure clause

and those afforded under the fourth amendment, the California Supreme Court relied solely on California law in holding that deliberate
or reckless misstatements compel automatic quashing of the warrant.

39

The law changed when the people of California passed Proposition
8.140 Since the enactment of Proposition 8, a criminal defendant's
challenge to the admissability of evidence establishing guilt or innocence
is controlled by federal law.' 41 If relevant evidence is proffered at a
criminal proceeding, it can be excluded only if its admission violates
the federal Constitution. 42 Proposition 8 eliminates the judicially created remedy of exclusion of evidence as a penalty for illegal action
except when mandated by the federal Constitution. 43
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether
disclosure of information that would lead the defense to discover the

informant's identity is required. 144 However, several California courts

of appeal have considered whether the defendant should be allowed
discovery of police records regarding the reliability of the confidential
informant. 14 These courts have come to different conclusions. 146

139. Kurland, 28 Cal. 3d at 383 fn.2, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 667 n.2, 618 P.2d at 213 n.2.
140. 1982 Cal. Stat. prop. 8, sec. 1, at A-186 (enacting CAL. CoNsT., art I, § 28(d)).
"Except as provided by statute hereafterr enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in
each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding,
including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a
juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court." CAL. Cowsr., art. I,
§ 28(d).
141. See People v. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985); People v. Crabb,
191 Cal. App. 3d 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1987); People v. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d
1258, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988); People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854
(1988) (all applying federal law of Franks v. Delaware to California cases involving the possibility
of suppression of evidence).
142. In re Lance W. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886-87, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
143. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1492, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 861. Thus, even if affilants run
afoul of Kurland, Cook, and Theodor, there is no remedy for mere negligence, and the remedy
for perjury or reckless indifference is to correct the misinformation and retest the warrant-the
warrant is no longer peremptorily quashed. Id.
144. See e.g., Franks, 438 U.S. at 170 The Court did not address whether disclosure of
informant's identity is required once substantial preliminary showing of misstatement has been
made. Id.
145. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985); Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d 390,
236 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1987); Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988);
Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854. See infra notes 151-217 (discussing courts
of appeal decisions).
146. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (holding discovery of police
records is allowed); Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (holding discovery
of police records is not allowed); Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1261, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 20
(holding discovery of police records is allowed); Broome, 201 Cal. App. at 1483, 247 Cal. Rptr.
at 855 (holding discovery of police records is allowed).
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B. Application of Franks in California
Courts applying the requirements of Franks note the difficulty of
requiring defendants to make a preliminary showing of deliberate or
reckless misstatements when the affidavit contains information provided
by a confidential informant. 147 The Franks court's prerequisites to a
49
hearing to controvert a warrant 48 and the informer's privilege rule
50
combine to impair a defendant's ability to uncover perjured warrants.

147. See e.g., United States v. Kiser, 716 F.2d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1983) (preliminary
showing requirement difficult for defendant attempting to establish that informant does not
edst); United States v. Brian, 507 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.R.I. 1981) (defendant cannot obtain
information needed to show entitlement to Franks hearing where search warrant affidavit relies
primarily on confidential informant); People v. Lucente, 116 l.2d 133, 506 N.E.2d 1269,
1275 (1987) (defendant obviously lacks the very information necessary to determine the source
of false statements).
Some courts have suggested a lower standard for making the preliminary showing because
the defendant lacked access to the information required for a threshold showing of falsity.
See, e.g., Brian, 507 F. Supp. at 766 (where defendant's sworn statement denies the search
warrant affidavit's allegations and makes "some minimal showing of inconsistency," the court
may conduct in camera interview of affiant); State v. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d 812, 820, 699 P.2d
1234, 1239 (1985) (where defendant presents information that "casts a reasonable doubt" on
affidavit's recitals, defendant may be entitled to hearing).
For example, in Casal, the Washington Supreme Court determined what circumstances would
entitle a defendant to an in camera hearing to challenge an affidavit's veracity regarding
statements made by a confidential informant. Casal at 813, 699 P.2d at 1235. In Casal, the
defendant, who was unable to locate the alleged informant, submitted a sworn statement
concerning statements made by the informant to the defendant. Id. at 814-15, 699 P.2d at
1236. According to the Casal court, if the challenged statements are the sole basis for probable
cause determination and the defendant "casts a reasonable doubt" on the veracity of material
representations contained therein, then the trial court should exercise its discretion to determine
whether an in camera examination of either the affiant or the informant is necessary. Id. at
820, 699 P.2d at 1239. The court noted that the rule is inapplicable where probable cause is
established independently of the challenged statements. Id. at 820-21, 699 P.2d. at 1239. The
in camera hearing is used to determine the veracity of recitals contained in the search warrant
affidavit. Id. at 819, 699 P.2d at 1238. In People v. Poindexter, 90 Mich. App. 599, 282
N.W.2d 411 (1979), the Michigan Court of Appeals chose not to create a new standard but
gave the trial court wide discretion in determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing.
Poindexter, 90 Mich. App. at 609 n.4, 282 N.W.2d at 416 n.4. Similarly, in Brian, the District
Court of Rhode Island merely required defendant's sworn denial of statements contained in a
wiretap affidavit along with some minimal showing of inconsistency before ordering an in
camera interview of the affiant. Brian, 507 F. Supp. at 766. The court noted that without the
informant's statements, there probably would not have been a probable cause determination.
Id. Therefore, the ex parte in camera hearing would allow the judge to satisfy him or herself
of the affiant's veracity. Id. The court noted that such a hearing protects the defendants'
fourth amendment rights as well as the government's interest in preserving the anonymity of
informants. Id.
148. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. See supra notes 111-38 and accompanying text (discussion
of Franks).
149. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 55. See supra notes 74-88 and accompanying
text (discussion of Roviaro).
150. Grano, supra note 18 at 449.
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The California courts of appeal disagree on whether a defendant is
entitled to discover police records to help make the preliminary showing
required by Franks.
1.

The Rivas Motion

In People v. Rivas,151 the court stated that a criminal defendant's
opportunity to secure a Franks hearing rests in large part upon his
ability to discover whether the affidavit contains inaccuracies.112 The
Court of Appeal for the Fifth District held that the defendant was
entitled to adequate discovery pertaining to the accuracy of the affiant's
statements about a confidential informant's reliability, provided that
the magistrate follow an in camera prescreening procedure to protect
the confidentiality of the informant's identity.' 3 The defendant was
allowed to discover items relevant to whether the statements made in
the affidavit were true.' 4
In Rivas, police officers searched defendant's residence pursuant to
a search warrant and found cocaine. 5 5 The affidavit used to obtain
the search warrant relied heavily upon information provided to the
police by a confidential informant. 5 6 The affiant credited the informant's statements by noting that the same informant had provided
police with information that led to the arrest of two persons within
the last six monthsY.5 7
Before trial, the defense counsel filed a motion for discovery. 8 The
motion sought various documents, including all notes, arrest reports,
crime reports, search warrants, and warrant affidavits that were relevant
to the statements contained in the search warrant affidavit. The defense
alleged that the prosecution held these documentsY59 The defense
counsel believed that the information contained in these records might

151. 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1985).
152. Id. at 320, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 482 (1985). But see, People v Broome 201 Cal. App.
3d 1479, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1988) (defendants made the preliminary showing required by
Frankswithout discovery of police records).
153. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 316, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
156. Id. See supra note 47 (reproduction of affidavit).

157. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 479. Further the affidavit

acknowledged that the informant had been paid for the information given, and that the
informant used drugs. Id.

158.

Id. at 315, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 478.

159.

Id.
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1
assist in undermining factual statements made in the affidavit. 60 Specifically, the defendant sought to attack statements alleging that the
confidential informant had been a reliable source of information to
the police in previous cases.161 The defendant also sought the informant's felony conviction record, the pay vouchers for money paid to
the informant in the case, police reports from cases pending against
the informant, and documents relating to any promises made to the
informant to induce his cooperation. 16 2 The defense counsel claimed he
was not attempting to learn the informant's identity indicating that he
was willing to have the informant's name deleted before the documents
were produced.6 3 The defense argued that the discovery was essential
to any subsequent defense attempts to bring a motion to suppress the
164
evidence obtained under the search warrant. Without discovery the
defense would be unable to make the substantial preliminary showing
165
required by Franks that the affidavit contained inaccuracies.
The prosecution objected to this discovery on the grounds that the
release of this information allowed the defendant to determine the
identity of the informant. 1 In the alternative, the prosecution suggested
that an in camera hearing be held to determine whether discovery was
needed. 67 The trial court denied discovery and refused to hold an in
camera hearing, concluding that the defendant was not entitled to
discovery concerning the facts alleged in the affidavit without first

160. Id. at 315, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
161. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 479. Defendant sought reports
regarding the information furnished by the informant previously, reports regarding the arrest
of the two persons and the drugs seized which resulted from the informants information, the
search warrants and affidavits used in the previous arrests, the rap sheet of the defendant,
pay vouchers of payments made to the informant, and negotiations made with the informant
for the information. Id.
An interesting question arises from the Rivas type discovery. How much information is
suppose to be released to the defense regarding the informant's past relationship with the
police? Rivas is not specific as to whether information must be released regarding all prior
cases the informant has worked on or just a few of the prior cases. If just a few, which case
reports must be released? Should reports form the last few cases be released or the first few
cases the informant worked on? Some informant's have a longstanding relationship with law
enforcement and may have worked on dozens even hundreds of cases. Conceivably, if
information regarding all of the prior cases the informant has worked on was discoverable,
each time the informant were used, discovery would involve paper work from hundreds of
cases.

162. Id.
163. Id. at 317,
164. Id. at 317,
165. Rivas, 170
U.S. 154).
166. Id. at 317,
167. Id. at 317,

216 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
216 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
Cal. App. 3d at 317, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 480 (as required by Franks, 438
216 Cal. Rptr. at 479-80.
216 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
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satisfying the Franks preliminary showing requirement.'61 The defense
appealed.

69

The Fifth District of the California Court of Appeal reversed and
held that the competing interests of the government and the defendant
could be accommodated by the use of in camera review. 7 0 The in
camera procedure protects the defendant's concern that the informant
might have been wholly imaginary, while at the same time it protects
the interests of law enforcement in preserving the confidentiality of the
informant. 71 The court drew a distinction between a hearing to challenge the search warrant affidavit pursuant to Franks and the defendant's right to adequate discovery.' 72
In discussing the contours of the right to discovery, the Rivas court

recognized that the defendant must make some showing of potential
168. Id.
169. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 320, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
170. Id. at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483, See State v. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d 812, 699 P.2d
1234 (1985), stating:
The following procedural guidelines are to be followed in structuring such an in
camera hearing:
1. The defendant and his counsel are to be strictly excluded from the proceeding,
but the prosecutor may be present.
2. Defense counsel may submit written questions, reasonable in length, which shall
be asked by the trial judge.
3. A transcript of the proceeding must be made and sealed for possible appellate
review.
4. Precautions are to be taken to protect the identity of the informant; the in camera
hearing may be held at a place other than the courthouse if deemed necessary to
guarantee the informant's anonymity.
Id.
Other courts have similarly endorsed in camera hearing devices. See e.g., United States v.
Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the "in camera procedure provides
an equally-acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the Government and the
accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether a law enforcement
officer has lied"); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding
that if "the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing in which neither the defendant
nor his attorney participates is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's
information, then no disclosure is necessary"); People v. Kurland 28 Cal. 3d 376, 394-395 nn.
11-12, 618 P.2d 213, 224-25 nn. 11-12, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667, 678-679 nn. 11-12.
171. Grano, supra note 18 at 445-47. Because the in camera hearing serves to protect the
interests of both the government and the defendant, many courts have endorsed the in camera
hearing device. See e.g. United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 986 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Alexander, 559 F.2d. 1339, 1334 (5th Cir. 1977) ("in camera hearing may be helpful
in balancing those interests"); Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1072-3 (holding that the "in camera
procedure provides an equally-acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the
Government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether
a law enforcement officer has lied"); Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 725 (holding that if "the trial
judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing in which neither the defendant nor his attorney
participates is adequate to explore the foundation of the informant's information, then no
disclosure is necessary"). Commentators have generally viewed the in camera hearing device
favorably. Grano supra note 18 at 445-47.
172. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
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inaccuracies in the affidavit before being permitted an in camera
discovery hearing. 173 However, the court failed to announce what kind
174
of showing would suffice to trigger this discovery. The court envisioned a lesser standard than is required for veracity hearings under
conclusory
Franks.17 5 In doing so, Rivas appears to accept that a 76
burden.1
the
satisfies
reliability
challenge to the informant's
2. People v Crabb: The Rivas Motion Allows Unfettered Police
Record Discovery
Faced with the issue of whether a criminal defendant is entitled to
discovery of police records concerning the reliability of a confidential77
informant, the Sixth District Court of Appeal in People v. Crabb'
expressly refused to follow Rivas17 8 In Crabb, evidence of the defendant's guilt was obtained under authority of a warrant directing the
search of the defendant's home. 17 9 The warrant was issued on the
strength of an affidavit which relied upon information supplied by
8
'
four confidential informants.?' The affidavit was facially sufficient.'
Before trial the defendant moved to discover police records relating to
the confidential informants who supplied information underlying the
warrant.'8 The defendant sought records of the informants' arrests
and convictions, all evidence of money paid to them by police, records
of the information they had furnished in other cases, and evidence of
83
the number of arrests and search warrants issued as a result. Relying
upon Rivas, the defendant contended that he properly sought to inspect

173. Id.
174. Id. (if the identity of the informant is unknown to defense counsel, defendant an do
little to challenge the affidavit except in conclusory terms).
175. Id. at 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 483. In Rivas defendant's only challenge was to the
accuracy of the affiant's statements about the informant. Defendant did not offer any proof
of misstatements made by the affiant in the affidavit. Id.
176. Id. at 315, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 478. The showing made in Rivas was: After being
arrested and charged, defendant made a motion for pre-preliminary examination discovery.
Id. The motion sought various documents, allegedly held by the prosecution, which defendant
believed might undermine certain statements contained in the search warrant affidavit; specifically, the statements alleging a particular confidential informant had been a reliable source
of information to the police in other cases. Id.
177. 191 Cal. App. 3d 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1987).
178. Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (in the Court's view Rivas
did not square with the Supreme Court's mandate in Franks).
179. Id.

180. Id.
181. Id.
182.
183.

Id. at 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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police records to find evidence with which to discredit the affiant and
invalidate the warrant. 184 The defendant maintained that this evidence
was in the sole possession of the prosecution, and that to preclude him
from obtaining the information through discovery was improper.' The
trial court denied the defendant's motion for discovery. 86 The defendant
filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of his
home, but subsequently withdrew it claiming that because of the denial
of his discovery motion, he had insufficient evidence of any material
misstatements or omissions in the affidavit to warrant a hearing on
the veracity of the affiant under Franks v. Delaware.8 '
On appeal, the court observed that the Rivas court had approved
of "unfettered police record discovery."' 88 The preliminary showing
required by Franks prevents veracity hearings to obtain discovery. 89

Accordingly, the Crabb court concluded that the decision in Rivas was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mandate in Franks v. Delaware.'90 The Crabb court construed the defendant's "Rivas motion"
to be a random search for evidence to show the affiant's lack of

veracity. 191 The court held that the defendant was not entitled to any

police record discovery before making the substantial preliminary showing required by Franks. 92 Additionally, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to a suppression hearing since he did not reveal
statements or omissions sufficient to satisfy the preliminary showing
required by Franks. 93
3. People v Luttenberger: The Rivas Motion Is Consistent With
Franks
The First District Court of Appeal also has considered the issue
of whether a defendant is allowed to discover police records concerning the reliability of a confidential informant in People v. Lut184.

Id. at 394-95, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 386. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (court

is only interested in finding out if the affiant told the truth in the affidavit not whether the
informant told the truth).
185.
186.

Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 394-95, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
Id. at 393, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 386.

187.

Id.

188.
189.
190.
at 314,
191.

Id. at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387. See Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d
216 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 387.

192. Id.at 396, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
193. Id.
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TENBERGER.. 194

In Luttenberger the police officers searched the

defendant's home pursuant to a search warrant based on an affidavit
of a police detective whose source of information for the search
warrant was a confidential informant. 195 The search resulted in the
seizure of evidence leading to charges against the defendant for
possession of methamphetamine and marijuana for sale while armed
with a firearm.19 The warrant affidavit provided no details regarding
the confidential informant's prior reliability or police corroboration
of conclusory drug sale allegations. 197 Before the preliminary hearing,
the defendant filed a Rivas motion seeking disclosure of the informant's identity.1 98 At the hearing on the Rivas motion, the defendant
modified his request and sought only an in camera review of the
informant's past experiences with law enforcement to determine
whether discoverable information bearing on the informant's reliability would be revealed. 199 The magistrate denied the motion.20 0 At
the preliminary hearing, the magistrate held the defendant to answer
the charges based on the testimony of the officer who conducted the
search.2°1 The defendant pleaded not guilty. °2
The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
20 1
lower court erred in failing to grant the defendant's Rivas motion.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss based on
the magistrate's failure to order an in camera hearing pursuant to
the requirements of Rivas.2°4 The prosecution appealed. 20 5 The First
Appellate District affirmed, holding that the right to discover police
records pertaining to the reliability of a confidential informant as set
194. 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988).
195. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 1259, 248 Cal. Rptr. 20, 21.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. The Rivas motion requested information "disclosed or discoverable" as to the
informant's past experiences with dangerous drugs, any pending cases against the informant
at the time of the disclosure, whether he informant was in custody, whether the informer had
ever provided false information, any police reports of incidents "filed" against Luttenberger,
any pay vouchers for the informant's services to the police, any "promises made by the
police," and representations made to the informant. Id. at 1260 n.l.
199. See People's Opening Brief at 3, Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1258, 248 Cal.
Rptr. at 20 (1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal). In arguing for granting of the Rivas
motion, defense counsel observed:
"How can I possibly say there's something about [the officer's] affidavit that's suspect if I'm
not given any information? Id.
200. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 1261, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
201. Id. at 1260, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
202. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
203. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
204.

Luttenberger,200 Cal. App. 3d at 1260, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 23.

205.

Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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for challenges
forth in Rivas does not contravene the federal standard
2
to search warrant affidavits set forth in Franks. 06
4. People v. Broome: Franks SubstantialPreliminary Showing
Standard Satisfied By Defendants
In People v. Broome,207 a search warrant was based on a controlled
buy2l s conducted by a confidential informant under an officer's
direction.2 The defendants moved to traverse the warrant based
upon their own affidavits denying that the controlled buy took place
and the affidavits of others giving the defendants an alibi during the
time the drugs were allegedly purchased. 210 The defendants also moved
for disclosure of the identity of the informant and for production
of the drugs purchased during the controlled buy. 21' The trial court
ordered production of the controlled buy drugs and took evidence
in camera to determine whether the controlled buy took place at a
time contradicted by the defense affidavits.212 The prosecutor resisted
on the ground that the court was allowing the defense to traverse
2
and discover without the preliminary showing required by Franks. 11
The prosecutor elected to suffer dismissal as a sanction for non214
production of the controlled buy substance.

206. Id. The People's Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court
on August 18, 1988.
207. 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 247 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1988).

208. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1483-84, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 855-856. Police officers were
told by a confidential informant that the two defendant's were "dealing in crank" and had
offered to sell methamphetamine to the informant. Id. Police officers thereafter set up a
controlled purchase with the aid of the informant. Id. The informant and the informant's
vehicle were searched by the affiant then the informant was provided with funds to purchase

the methamphetamine. Id. The informant was observed by the affiant arriving at the defendants'
residence and entering the residence. Id. After approximately fifteen minutes, the affiant
observed the informant exit the defendants' residence and leave the area in the informant's
vehicle. Id. The affiant then met with the informant at a pre-determined location. Id.
The informant gave the affiant a clear plastic bundle containing an off-white powder. Id.
The informant said the substance had been obtained from defendant 1 (the wife) in exchange
for the funds supplied by the informant and that defendant 1 had offered to provide the

informant with additional amounts of crank at any time. Id. The officer subsequently searched
the informant and the informant's vehicle and did not find contraband or the funds supplied
to the informant by the officer. Id.
209. Broome, 201 Cal. App. at 1483-84, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56.
210. Id. at 1485, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1486, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, expressly disagreeing
with Crabb and agreeing with Rivas on the discovery issue.2 15 The
Broome court, like the Rivas court, drew a distinction between a
hearing to challenge the search warrant affidavit pursuant to Franks
and the defendant's right to discovery.2 1 6 The court also ruled that,
in any case, the defendants had met the "preliminary showing"
requirement of Franks through their own affidavits and those which
gave the defendants an alibi for the time alleged for the controlled
buy.

217

III.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION To THE Rivas Motion

The California Supreme Court should not allow Rivas motions for
discovery of police records because the Rivas discovery motion has
the effect of circumventing the informer's privilege rule. 218 Because
of the nature of an informant's function, he usually moves in the
same circles and is frequently an aquaintance or associate of the
defendant. 21 9 Therefore, even if the informant's name is deleted from
the records, details remaining in the official documents and the
circumstances surrounding the offenses will often indirectly lead to
the disclosure of the informant's identity. 2 For example, since a
defendant is typically familiar with the facts of other criminal investigations involving the informant, the defendant may have the opportunity to compare notes with other defendants who have been
informed on by the same informant. This opportunity to "compare
notes" may give a defendant important clues regarding the informant's identity. Even if discovery is conducted in camera, it would
likely be performed hastily because of the judicial time constraint. 22
As a result, effective screening of official information is uniikely,m
and prosecutors may elect to dismiss a case rather than endure the
risks to an informant associated with the Rivas style discovery23

215. Id. at 1494-95, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 863-64.
216. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1487-89, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 857-59.
217. Id. at 1495-97, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
218. See supra notes 61-100 and accompanying text (discussion of the informer's privilege
rule).
219. See 2 W. LAFAvE, note 25, at 704.
220. Id.
221. See People's Opening Brief at 16, People v. Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258,
248 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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Rivas discovery motions should not be allowed because prehearing
discovery imposes significant burdens on already overburdened
courts. 224 Almost all Rivas motions are made before the preliminary
hearing and may require a continuance of the preliminary hearing
225
thereby adding to the congestion of the preliminary hearing courts.
Franks' substantial showing standard limits the occasions that veracity
hearings will burden the lower courts. 226 However, Rivas style discovery imposes on the lower courts the burden of conducting discovery hearings through the use of in camera proceedings in all cases
involving challenges to search warrants based on information supplied
by a confidential informant. 227 All defendants with cases in which
the incriminating evidence was obtained by a search warrant based
on information given by an informant will request discovery of the
police records concerning the informant. 228 If Rivas is upheld, the
Rivas discovery motion will become a standard defense motion. In
short, the Rivas motion adds an entirely new layer of procedure to
cases involving search warrants based on information supplied by
confidential informants.
Finally, the California Supreme Court should not allow Rivas
motions for discovery of police records because the Rivas discovery
motion has the effect of circumventing the requirments announced
in Franks v. Delaware.229 Under Franks, before a suppression hearing
is allowed, the defendant has the burden of making a substantial
preliminary showing, including an offer of proof -of deliberate or
reckless false statement or omission in the search warrant affidavit
that negates probable cause.- 0 Rivas simply allows the defense to
hold the same type of suppression hearing disguised as a discovery
hearing without a substantial preliminary showing. 231 A defendant is

224. Id.
225. Id. See also, Locher, supra note 71 at 16-17 (suggesting that three layers will be added
to the court system).
226. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (only a criminal defendant who makes the substantial
showing is entitled to a hearing).
227. People's Opening Brief at 16, Luttenberger, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1258, 248 Cal. Rptr.
20 (1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).

228.

See Grano, supra note 18, at 407 (defendants have nothing to lose by asking for

discovery and possibly their freedom to gain if the prosecution is forced to dismiss the case

out of fear of disclosure of the informant's identity).
229. Compare Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477 with Franks438 U.S. 154
and 1982 Cal. Stat. prop. 8, sec 1, at A-186 (enacting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d). See also,
Crabb, 191 Cal. App. 3d 390, 236 Cal. Rptr. 385.
230. Franks, 438 U.S. 154. See infra notes 111-38 and accompanying text (discussing Franks
in detail).

231.
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able to obtain a "discovery hearing" with nothing more than a
conclusory challenge to the informant's reliability. 2 2 A Franks hearing involves questioning the affiant and others to explore matters
relating to the affidavit that might be false or a material omission. 231
A Rivas discovery proceeding involves precisely the same questioning.
In analyzing the type of showing required before a hearing is allowed,
the United States Supreme Court specifically stated in Franks that
the requirement of a substantial preliminary showing would suffice
to prevent the misuse of a veracity hearing for purposes of discovery.24 By allowing discovery before the substantial preliminary showing,the Rivas procedure allows the potential misuse sought to be
prevented in Franks to occur before the veracity hearing instead of
at the hearing itself. 235 Franks recognizes that affidavits supporting
search warrants are vested with a presumption of validity. 236 To
mandate a veracity hearing, the defendant's attack must be more
than conclusory. 237 This requirement is designed to prevent fishing
expeditions by the defense. 2 1 The Rivas discovery motion cannot be
labeled anything but a fishing expedition because the defense makes
the Rivas motion hoping to find inaccuracies between the police
records and the affidavit with which to make the preliminary showing
required by federal law. 239 This is specifically the type of fishing
expedition that the requirements of Franks set out to avoid.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware announced that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to challenge a facially
valid search warrant upon a substantial preliminary showing of
misstatements made in the affidavit by the police officer. 2 This right

232. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text (discussion of showing made in Rivas).
233. See Locher, supra note 71, at 18.
234. Franks,438 U.S. at 170. See People v. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d 1479, 1491-94, 247
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-62 (1988). The court addressed this point, but then said that the discovery

criticized by Franks was general discovery, not limited discovery for purposes of gathering
facts for the veracity hearing. Id.
235.

See supra note 228 and accompanying text (all defendants, whose evidence against

them was based on a confidential informant, will likely request discovery of police records).
236.
237.

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
Id.

238. Id. at 171 (challenger's attack must be more than as mere desire to cross-examine the
affiant).
239. See, e.g., Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477.
240. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155.
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was limited by the Court for various reasons of public policy.2 41 The
court in Rivas held that a defendant is entitled to discovery of police
records for the purpose of challenging a search warrant affidavit
based on information provided by a confidential informant.242 As
shown in Broome discovery of police records regarding the confidential informant is not needed to make the preliminary showing required
by Franks.23 The Rivas motion is nothing but a creative way to
circumvent the requirements set out in Franks and the informer's
privilege rule. Accordingly the California Supreme Court should
invalidate the Rivas motion.
Cynthia Gill Lawrence

241. Id. at 165-71. See supra note 128 (discussing policy reasons discussed by the Franks
Court).
242. Rivas, 170 Cal. App. 3d 312, 322, 216 Cal. Rptr. 477, 483.
243. Broome, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 1483, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 855. See supra notes 207-17
and accompanying text (Broome held that the defendants had made the preliminary showing
without the discovery of police records).
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